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US Antidumping Decisions and the
WTO Standard of Review: Deference or Disregard?
Lee D. Hamilton*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Uruguay Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT 1994") produced a regime of international trade agreements
known loosely as the World Trade Organization ("WTO").' These agreements
were partially intended to enhance the power of international dispute resolution
panels, which previously had been unable to make decisions that were binding
on all parties. The new WTO system attempted to fix that problem, but in the
process created a new one, in that binding WTO review 2 of national actions
could infringe on traditional notions of national sovereignty.
One aspect of this infringement is international review of decisions made
by national bodies regarding the harm caused by certain unfair trade practices,
such as dumping.3 Nations have a particular interest in protecting domestic
industries from unfair competition, especially if the governments of those
nations rely heavily on the support of domestic industries for political power. 4
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The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 ("Antidumping Agreement") states that dumping is found when "the export
price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price,
in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the
online
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Agreement,
art
2.1,
available
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country."
Antidumping
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/19-adp.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2003).
For a discussion of the efficiency and political rationales of national antidumping regulations,
see Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-Japan Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and Countervaiing
Duty Laws, 16 Ariz J Ind & Comp L 689 (1999). See also World Trade Organization, Report
of the Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products From
Japan, Annex A 219, WTO Doc No WT/DS184/R (Feb 28, 2001) (hereinafter Japan Hot
Rolled Steell) (written submission of Japan, claiming that the US steel industry influenced a
change in the US antidumping law that violated the US's obligations'under the WTO).
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Outside review of these political decisions could have negative effects on
domestic industries and national governments.
Rulings of the United States International Trade Commission ("US ITC")
have recently been challenged before the WTO, and various Dispute Settlement
Boards ("DSBs") have determined that several of the United States' laws
implementing the WTO do not conform with the various agreements of GATT
1994.5 In addition to questions over the implementation of GATT 1994, various
parties have also questioned whether the US Department of Commerce's
("DOC") interpretation of the US antidumping laws comports with those
agreements.6 This development will consider the latter of the two issues,
especially addressing the actual standard of review the DSBs use when
examining national interpretations of GATT 1994. This development will show
that the DSBs are applying a nondeferential standard whereby the Boards
substitute their own interpretation of the agreements for that of the member
nations.

II. THE ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT AND DEFERENCE
When Nation A suspects or believes that Nation B is unfairly dumping its
products on Nation A's domestic market, Nation A is permitted, under the
GATT 1994 system, to take action to protect its domestic industry from harm.'
The chief method by which Nation A can protect itself is through the
imposition of countervailing duties, or import tariffs, on the dumped goods
from Nation B, so that the market price in the importing nation matches the
market price in the producing nation.8 This system allows Nation A to determine
whether a dumped product has harmed its domestic industry, and whether to
impose a countervailing duty to counteract that harm. But it also allows Nation
B to appeal adverse national decisions to a DSB if it believes that the
5
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World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat Products From Germany 9.1, WTO Doc No WT/DS213/R
(July 3, 2002) (hereinafter German Flat Stee (finding that parts of the US Tariff Act of 1930,
19 USC § 1675(c) (2000), were in violation of US obligations under GATT 1994); World
Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974 7.96, WTO Doc No WT/DS152/R (Dec 22, 1999) (hereinafter United States Section
301) (holding that US law that determined whether treaty rights had been violated would
violate GATT 1994 in the absence of an Administration policy to carve out cases within the
jurisdiction of a WTO DSB).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic
Random Access Memoy Semiconductors (DRAMs) of One Megabit orAbove From Korea 7.1, WTO
Doc No WT/DS99/R (Jan 29, 1999) (hereinafter Korea Semiconductors) (finding that certain
US Department of Commerce regulations defining the procedures by which the US ITC
could decide to allow antidumping measures to continue violated the agreements of GAIT
1994).
See Antidumping Agreement at art 5.1 (cited in note 3).
Id at art 9.1.
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countervailing duties were imposed in violation of the agreements that make up
GATT 1994. 9
Under the Antidumping Agreement, countervailing duties expire five years
after their inception unless the imposing nation finds that "the expiry of the duty
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury."'
The Agreement also requires that antidumping duties be terminated immediately
if the imposing nation finds that a duty is no longer warranted at any time after
its imposition. To do this, the nation may consider whether "the continued
imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, [or] whether the injury
would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed ... ."" Recently,
various nations have challenged the procedures used by the United States in its
interim reviews and sunset reviews, which determine the likelihood of continued
injury and whether duties should remain in place. 2 The Antidumping Agreement
provides that a DSB can be empanelled in order to decide whether the duties
applied were proper and continue to be necessary to avert a likely harm. 3
The Antidumping Agreement specifies the standard of review applied by
the DSBs, and appears to require that the DSBs give deference to the findings of
the national panels. The rule reads:
(i) ... If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was
unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion, the evaluation should not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement
admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the
authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon
4
one of those permissible interpretations.
The language of the Antidumping Agreement was the result of intense
negotiations at the Uruguay Round of GATT. Disputes over the amount of
deference DSBs should give to national panels nearly derailed the talks."
The phrase "permissible interpretation" was specifically chosen over
"reasonable interpretation" in order to enhance the power of the DSBs, but it
still seems to leave some room for deference. 6 This language reflects the tension
between the notion that DSBs should allow some variations in interpretation
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Id at art 17.5.
Id at art 11.3 (emphasis added).

Id at art 11.2.
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See Antidumping Agreement at art 17.5 (cited in note 3).
Id at art 17.6.
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See Croley and Jackson, 90 Am J Intl L at 194 (cited in note 2).
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among the member nations, and the competing notion that the bodies should
enforce a uniform interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement.
III. A RECENT CASE: KOREA SEMICONDUCTORS
A Dispute Settlement Board ruled in 1999 on a case brought by Korea in
which the DSB asserted that the standards used by the DOC to determine
whether antidumping duties should be terminated were in violation of the
Antidumping Agreement. 7
The panel in Korea Semiconductors agreed with Korea on several of its points,
and held that certain standards applied by the DOC violated the United States'
treaty obligations. 8 The panel held that 19 CFR 5 353.25(a)(2)(ii), the regulation
detailing the procedure by which the DOC can determine whether the
revocation of antidumping duties would lead to continuing harm to domestic
industry, 9 was inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. °
When the DSB analyzed the regulation and determined that it did not comply
with the United States' obligations under GATT 1994,21 the DSB stated that it
was applying the standard of review laid out in Article 17.6(ii) of the
Antidumping Agreement. 2
The DSB found that the Antidumping Agreement requires that
antidumping duties be prolonged only so long as they are necessary to prevent
injurious dumping. 23 It also found that the standard applied by Article 11.2 of
the Agreement was more stringent than the DOC's "not likely" to recur
standard.24 When it determined that the DOC's standard was inconsistent with
the Antidumping Agreement, the DSB found that the standard rested on an
impermissible interpretation of the Agreement.
The Antidumping Agreement requires the termination of an antidumping
duty if the duty is no longer considered "necessary to offset dumping," or if
there is not a finding that "the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the
duty were removed or varied., 25 The impermissibility found by the panel seems
to be the difference between the US and WTO findings enabling continuation of
antidumping duties: that a recurrence of dumping is not "not likely" to recur
17
18

19

20
21
22
23
24
25

Korea Semiconductors at § VII (cited in note 6).
Id at 7.1.
See 19 CFR § 353.25(a)(2)(ii) (1997) ("The Secretary may revoke an order [imposing
antidumping duties] ...if the Secretary concludes that: ...(ii) It is not likely that those
persons will in the future sell the merchandise at less than foreign market value.").
Id.
Korea Semiconductors at 6.54 (cited in note 6).
Id at 6.22.
Id at 6.41.
Id at 6.48.
Antidumping Agreement at art 11.2 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
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under the US provision, and that a recurrence is "likely to ... recur" under the
Antidumping Agreement. 26 The DSB panel found that this subtle difference in
wording resulted in a different standard of proof, and therefore required that the
DOC prove the affirmative likelihood of recurrence, rather than disproving the
unlikelihood of recurrence.
The DSB's textual analysis does not permit even minor variation in the
wording of regulations implementing the Antidumping Agreement, and instead
leads to a requirement of formal uniformity between the DOC regulations and
the text of the Agreement. If that is the case, then an "impermissible
interpretation" is an interpretation that is not textually identical to the language
of the Agreement. Under such a stringent standard of review, there seems to be
very little room for deference to interpretations of the Agreement made by the
DOC.

IV. IMPACT OF THE RULE ON FUTURE CASES
The weak standard of deference applied to the DOC in Korea Semiconductors
could lead to further rulings against the United States. Japan has raised similar
arguments to the ones pressed by Korea in a second hot rolled steel case filed in
April 2002.27 The fact that the United States has already lost antidumping cases
such as Japan Hot Rolled Steel I and Korea Semiconductors, coupled with the fact that
this case challenges a regulation very similar in language to the one challenged in
Korea Semiconductors,28 leads to the conclusion that the DSBs will give little
deference to the US government's interpretations of GATT 1994. While
national uniformity may have been the goal of the drafters of GATT 1994, this
rule of interpretation is certainly not obvious from the text of Article 17.6 of the
Agreement. Furthermore, it may step too roughly on the prerogatives of national
governments and lead to wide disregard of DSB rulings and a concomitant
injury to the goal of free trade.
Nonetheless, nations may believe that their interests are better served by a
strong dispute resolution regime, in order to prevent other nations from
cheating by misinterpreting the GATT 1994 Agreements. If so, then they are
likely to countenance a small affront to their sovereignty. At the same time, a
26

27

The panel in Korea Semiconductors actually made that very distinction, stating, "A finding that
an event is 'likely' implies a greater degree of certainty that the event will occur than a finding
that the event is not 'not likely'." Korea Semiconductors at 6.46 (cited in note 6).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Sunset Review of Anidumping

Duties on Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat ProductsFromJapan, WTO Doc No WT/DS244/4
28

(Apr 5, 2002) (hereinafter Japan Hot Rolled Steel I).
Compare 19 CFR § 353.25(a)(2)(ii) (cited in note 19), with 19 CFR § 351.222(i)(1)(2) (2002)
("[T]he Secretary will revoke an order ... (ii) where the Secretary determines that revocation
or termination is not likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of ... dumping.") (emphasis
added).
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simple change in the language of US regulations may save them from violating
the Antidumping Agreement, without appreciably affecting the outcome of cases
before the DOC, especially if the difference between "likely" and not "not likely"
is as narrow as it seems.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of the amount of sovereignty retained by member nations of
the WTO has existed since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations in 1994.29 Any review by international bodies of the decisions of
national agencies would seem to impinge upon that sovereignty, since those
bodies can act with near impunity and are virtually free from higher review.
Therefore it would appear important for those bodies to give some deference to
the national agencies' interpretations of their obligations.
When WTO DSBs review the actions of US agencies with regard to
antidumping in particular, very little deference is given to the DOC's
interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement embodied in its own regulations.
It seems instead that the DSBs substitute their own judgment for that of the
national agencies by narrowly deciding what interpretations are "permissible." A
fair reading of the Agreement, which speaks of more than one "permissible"
interpretation, may require a more deferential standard.3" Regardless, for the
WTO system to function well, a more deferential standard of review would be
preferable, acknowledging the validity of the varied approaches that member
nations may use when enacting and interpreting the Antidumping Agreement.

29
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Croley and Jackson, 90 Am J Intl L at 194 (cited in note 2).
See Antidumping Agreement at art 17.6 (cited in note 3).
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